We explore to what extent we can propose …xed negotiation rules as well as simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition-governments. We analyze the case where three parties can hold o¢ ce in the form of two-party coalitions. We de…ne the family of Weighted Rules, that select political agreements as a function of the bliss-points of the parties, and electoral results (Gamson's Law and equal-share among others are included). We show that every weighted rule yields a stable coalition. We make use of the theory of implementation to design a protocol (in the form of a mechanism) that guarantees that a stable coalition will govern. We …nd that no dominant-solvable mechanism can be used for this purpose, but there is a simultaneous-unanimity mechanism that implements it in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
When no political party reaches a strict majority in elections, coalition governments are usually formed. Political parties are the main actors in the bargaining process that leads to di¤erent types of government formation. Coalition governments are the norm in many European governments as shown for instance in the empirical works of Diermeier et al. (2003) and Müller and Str; m (2000) . When a coalition of political parties governs, stability of such government is one of the main concerns of voters. In brief, stability requires that no (majoritarian) coalition has incentives to interfere with the governing coalition. In this paper, we explore whether there are …xed negotiation rules as well as simple mechanisms (set of rules or protocols) that guarantee that after the elections, parties can come up with a stable coalition-government. It is a novelty of this paper that we make use of the theory of implementation to analyze this coalition-government problem.
We study the case where three parties can hold o¢ ce in the form of two-party coalitions. 1 Each party is identi…ed with a bliss-point in a multidimensional policy space. Elections have already taken place. We assume that, when forming coalition-governments, parties are not only policy-motivated, they also derive some bene…ts from holding o¢ ce. The policy adopted by a coalition is an agreement. Each agreement describes the policy that a coalition intends to pursue if it governs.
Under majority rule and a multidimensional policy space, no coalition can propose a policy that majority defeats every other policy (see Scho…eld, 1983; and Saari, 1997 , for a formal proof of this statement). This observation was made by Plott (1967) , who also suggested that there are some restrictions or constraints on the policies that a coalition can propose. Following Plott, if we account for the rule under which coalitions operate, it can be shown that there exist agreements that cannot be majority defeated.
In this paper, we propose some …xed negotiation rules under which coalitions can operate: the Weighted Rules. First, we de…ne the weighted functions that distribute bargaining power among parties as a function of their votes (or seats in parliament). We account for a diverse distribution of bargaining power: from equal-share to proportional share. Second, we de…ne the family of Weighted Rules, that select political agreements as a function of bargaining powers and bliss-points of the parties. The agreements derived in this way are a weighted average of the bliss-points of the parties.
Our …rst result is that every weighted rule yields a unique stable coalition: the agreement of this coalition cannot be majority defeated by the agreements of other coalitions. For each weighted rule, the stable function selects the only coalition that is stable.
We then study the existence of mechanisms implementing the stable function. A mechanism speci…es a space of messages (one for each party), and an outcome function (once each party announces a message, the outcome function selects a coalition). We show that there is no mechanism implementing the stable function in dominant strategies. We then analyze implementation in Nash equilibrium. We explore simple mechanisms where parties'messages are simultaneous (in this way we avoid a rule of order with the formateur as a player with …rst-move advantage). We study the simultaneous-unanimity mechanism where each party simultaneously announces a coalition that includes itself. 2 If two parties announce the same coalition, the outcome function selects such coalition. We show that this mechanism fails at implementing the stable function in Nash equilibrium. We then analyze an extended version of this mechanism where parties can announce any coalition (it only adds an extra element to the message space of each party). We show that this mechanism implements in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the stable function. Furthermore, every equilibrium of this mechanism (Nash and strong Nash) has a natural interpretation since the two parties that form the stable coalition announce such coalition. 3 The present paper is related to the literature on legislative bargaining games. This literature provides a positive analysis of legislatures where the decision making processes take the form of bargaining. Based on Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , these models provide "structure-induced equilibrium" in contexts where the core is empty. Thus, predictions on the governing coalitions and legislative voting positions are derived as a result of di¤erent bargaining processes among the parties (see for instance Baron, 1991; Duggan, 2000, 2006; Jackson and Moselle, 2002) . In contrast to this literature, our analysis is normative since we propose …xed negotiation rules as a way of escaping from the standard results of an empty core.
There are two other related papers that also describe some ways of escaping from the empty core (Kirchsteiger and Puppe, 1997 and Aragonès, 2007) . In contrast to our proposal, these authors do not specify a concrete procedure describing how the coalitions of parties reach political agreements. Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997) show that o¢ ce-seeking incentives play a central role to guarantee stable coalition governments. They also account for policymotivated incentives and show that these incentives guarantee stability when there are three parties. The policy-motivated incentives, as introduced by these authors are somehow ad hoc, since the preferences of the parties over coalitions depend on the distance between their political positions. We show that preferences of the parties, as represented by these authors, can be implicitly deduced when parties make agreements according to a weighted rule. Aragonès (2007) proposes a two-dimensional policy space where four political parties have symmetric political positions. She characterizes the stable government con…gurations (coalitions and political agreements) in terms of parties'reservation values, and intensity of preferences over issues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 de…nes the weighted rules and derives the results on stability. Section 4 presents the results on implementation. Section 5 concludes.
The model
There are three political parties N = f1; 2; 3g : Let R M be the policy space where M 2 is the number of political issues. Each party i 2 N has a di¤erent bliss-point x i 2 R M that speci…es its ideal policy on each of the political issues.
Elections have already taken place. Each party's number of votes (or seats in parliament) are given by = ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) where i > 0 for every i 2 N . A strict majority of votes is required to govern. No single party has a strict majority, but every two-party coalition is a minimal winning coalition. We just consider minimal winning coalitions.
A coalition is denoted by S; where S 2 ff1,2g , f1,3g , f2,3gg. An agreement for coalition S is given by x S 2 R M ; and it speci…es the policy that coalition S will support if it governs. A pro…le of agreements x describes an agreement for each coalition, x = (x 12 ; x 13 ; x 23 ).
Preferences of party i over agreements are represented by
where k i > 0 is party i's bene…ts from holding o¢ ce, and k:k is the Euclidean distance between the agreement of coalition S and the bliss-point of party i. We take k i su¢ ciently large to guarantee that the most preferred agreement of each party is one where it is included. 4 Given two di¤erent agreements x S ; x S 0 ; we say that party i strictly prefers coalition S to coalition S 0 when u i (x S ) > u i (x S 0 ) (when convenient we use notation S i S 0 ). Each pro…le of agreements x, induces a pro…le of preferences over coalitions = ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ), where each i speci…es party i's preferences over the three coalitions. For the sake of simplicity we do not consider indi¤erences. 5 We pursue two properties that are key when forming coalition-governments: e¢ ciency and stability.
We say that x S is e¢ cient when there is no
is e¢ cient, the parties included in coalition S cannot improve simultaneously by choosing another agreement. Every e¢cient agreement is located in the line between the bliss points of the parties. A pro…le of agreements x is e¢ cient if every agreement in x is e¢ cient.
Given a pro…le of agreements x and its induced preferences over coalitions , we say that coalition S is stable if there is no other coalition S 0 such that S 0 i S for all i 2 S 0 : We say that the pro…le of agreements x is stable when there is some coalition S that is stable.
When S is stable, there is no other coalition S 0 such that its members strictly prefer agreement x S 0 to x S : If S is stable, we say that S cannot be blocked by any other coalition. If x is not stable, however, every coalition is blocked by another coalition. In this case, the induced preferences over coalitions contain one of the following two circles: f1; 2g 1 f1; 3g 3 f2; 3g 2 f1; 2g, or f1; 3g 1 f1; 2g 2 f2; 3g 3 f1; 3g. 6 4 Our proposal is not within the scope of hedonic coalition structures (see Banerjee et al. 2001 , Bogomolnaia and Jackson 2002) since preferences over those coalitions where a party is not included, depend on the agreement made by the other parties. On this point we di¤er from Aragonès (2007), Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997), but we coincide with Rijt (2008) . 5 This is a minor assumption in a multidimensional policy space. 6 There are however examples of preferences containing circles and where there is a 5 3 The weighted rules
In this section we propose a family of rules that select pro…les of agreements as a function of the number of votes and bliss points of the parties. The negotiation of agreements within coalitions can be made according to di¤erent bargaining weights. Several authors analyze bargaining rules from a theoretical, empirical, and experimental point of view. For instance, Carrol and Cox (2007) provide an empirical analysis that supports Gamson's Law (the bargaining power of each party is proportional to the party's contribution of seats to the coalition) as the criterion that parties follow when coalition-pacts are pre-electoral. As shown in the experiments proposed by Fréchette et al. (2005) , post-electoral pacts are however characterized by other distributions of bargaining power such as the ability to form majoritarian coalitions. As we show next, our proposal of weighted rules de…nes a family of rules su¢ ciently extensive as to include di¤erent procedures that determine bargaining powers.
A weighted function distributes bargaining power among political parties. Formally, the weighted function f assigns to each party's number of votes (or seats), a fraction of power f ( i ) > 0 such that P De…nition: The weighted rule W f associated to a weighted function f selects, for each distribution of votes and parties' bliss points, a pro…le of agreements, W f ( ;
where each x S f satis…es:
Thus, each x S f is a weighted average of the bliss points of the parties included in S: We refer to every x S f as a weighted agreement. stable coalition. 7 Note that every convex combination of the proportional and equal-share function also quali…es as a weighted function.
6
To provide some examples, if f is the proportional function, then
i.e., the weighted rule yields agreements according to Gamson's Law. 8 If f is the equal share function, then every agreement selected by the weighted rule is the midpoint of the parties'bliss-points, i.e.,
Let S = fi; jg : Substituting Expression (2) in the utility function of party i yields
Hence, when agreements are selected according to a weighted rule, parties'preferences over those coalitions where they are included depend on the distance between the parties'bliss points. 9 Appendix A shows that Expression 3 can be also derived from the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution of a bargaining game within the parties in the coalition.
The following example illustrates a weighted rule. f ,x 23 f ). As it is shown in Figure 1 , the lines from the bliss points to the agreements of the opposite side cross in a single point (this property satis…es regardless of the weighted rule that we consider). 3  12  12  23  13  23  13  23 13 12
In this example, coalition S = f1,2g is stable (the two other coalitions are blocked by f1,2g).
It is easy to see that the weighted rules always yield e¢ cient pro…les of agreements since these agreements are located in the Pareto set (which corresponds to the line between the two parties'bliss-points). Moreover, as we show next, they also yield stable pro…les of agreements.
Theorem 1 Every weighted rule W f yields stable pro…les of agreements.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is a pro…le of agreements selected by a weighted rule that is not stable. Then, preferences over coalitions must contain a circle. Consider without loss of generality that f1; 2g 1 f1; 3g 3 f2; 3g 2 f1; 2g. Then, by Expression (3):
; which contradicts (c). Therefore, preferences do not contain a circle, and so, there is at least a coalition that is stable. 10 As a consequence of Theorem 1, we can derive the following result. Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that f1; 3g is stable. By Theorem 1, every pro…le of agreements selected by a weighted rule is such that preferences over coalitions do not contain a circle. Three cases are possible. Case 1: f1; 3g 1 f1; 2g and f1; 3g 3 f2; 3g : It implies that f1; 3g is stable. Since neither can f2; 3g be top-ranked for party 1, nor can f1; 2g be topranked for party 3, it must be that f1; 3g is top-ranked for party 1 and party 3. In addition, by e¢ ciency of the weighted agreements made by f1; 2g and f2; 3g respectively, coalition f1; 3g must be bottom-ranked for party 2. Case 2: f1; 2g 1 f1; 3g and f1; 2g 2 f2; 3g : Then, to guarantee that f1; 3g is stable, f1; 3g must be top ranked for party 2, a contradiction. Case 3: f2; 3g 2 f1; 2g and f2; 3g 3 f1; 3g : Then, to guarantee that f1; 3g is stable, f1; 3g must be top-ranked for party 2, a contradiction. Finally, suppose that there are two stable coalitions S and S 0 . Then, both coalitions must be top-ranked for the party in the intersection S \ S 0 ; but it contradicts the fact that there are no indi¤erences.
We describe next all the pro…les of preferences over coalitions where f1; 3g is stable (changing the identity of the parties we can derive every possible pro…le of preferences over coalitions). 13 12 13  12 23 23  23 13 12   1 2 3  13 23 13  12 12 12  23 13 23   1 2 3  13 23 13  12 12 23  23 13 12   1 2 3  13 12 13  23 23 23  12 13 12 When describing these pro…les, we do not only account for the results in Corollary 1, but also for the fact that every agreement is e¢ cient. Thus, if f1; 2g 2 f2; 3g then by e¢ ciency of the weighted agreement made by f2; 3g, party 3's preferences cannot be such that f1; 2g 3 f2; 3g :
The weighted rules induce a restricted domain of preferences over coalitions. In view of the above results, there are up to twelve di¤erent pro…les of preferences over coalitions that can be induced by the weighted rules.
Implementing the stable function
In this section, we explore to what extent there are simple protocols (or practices) that lead to stable coalition-governments. Such protocols must work whatever the underlying information of parties concerning the preferences of its partners. The theory of implementation provides the proper tools to solve our question. Some de…nitions are needed to proceed.
The weighted rules induce a restricted domain of pro…les of preferences that we denote by R. The Stable Function S : R ! ff1,2g , f1,3g , f2,3gg selects, for each admissible pro…le of preferences over coalitions 2 R, the stable coalition.
A mechanism is a pair (M; g) where M = X i2N M i ; each M i is the message space for party i; and g : M ! ff1,2g , f1,3g , f2,3gg is the outcome function that assigns to each pro…le of messages, a coalition. An equilibrium concept speci…es the strategic behavior of individuals faced with mechanism (M; g): We use the notions of dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and strong Nash equilibrium as equilibrium concepts. When the pro…le of preferences is ; a coalition generated as the outcome of an equilibrium of the mechanism (M; g) is called equilibrium coalition and is denoted by E(M; g; ).
De…nition: The mechanism (M; g) implements the Stable Function S via an equilibrium concept when for all admissible pro…le of preferences 2 R; the equilibrium coalition of (M; g) at is the stable coalition, i.e., E(M; g; ) = S( ) for all 2 R:
When a mechanism implements the Stable Function then, in every realization of the preferences of parties over coalitions, the resulting outcome obtained through strategic behavior (on the part of the parties facing the mechanism) is a stable coalition. 11 When a mechanism implements via two di¤erent equilibrium concepts, we refer to double-implementation.
We …rst show that there is no mechanism implementing the Stable Function in dominant strategies.
Theorem 2
The Stable Function is not implementable in dominant strategies.
Proof. According to Corollary 1, the domain of preferences R does not have a Cartesian product structure. Therefore, the standard revelation principle cannot be applied here. 12 Each party i has four types of preference relations denoted by f 1 i ; 2 i ; 3 i ; 4 i g : Consider the following three admissible pro…les of preferences: 3  13 12 13  12 23 23  23 13 12   1 2 3  12 12 23  13 23 13  23 13 12   1 2 3  13 23 23  12 12 13  23 13 12 If we suppose that there exists a mechanism (M; g) implementing S in dominant strategies, then each party i should have a dominant strategy for each type of preferences. Let m 1 i be the dominant strategy for party i when party i's preferences are 1 i , and let m 2 i be the dominant strategy of party i when party i's preferences are 2 i . According to the above described preferences, the outcome function g should satisfy:
However, if we consider the following non admissible pro…le of preferences: 13 ( 1 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 ) 1 2 3 13 12 23 12 23 13 23 13 12 where there is no stable coalition, the outcome function can select any coalition g(m 1 1 ; m 1 2 ; m 2 3 ) 2 S: Suppose that g(m 1 1 ; m 1 2 ; m 2 3 ) = f1; 2g ; then given its preference relations, party 3 improves by deviating to m 1 3 since then, as spec-i…ed by (4), the outcome is f1; 3g contradicting that m 2 3 is a dominant strategy for party 3 when its preferences are 2 3 . Suppose that g(m 1 1 ; m 1 2 ; m 2 3 ) = f1; 3g ; then given its preferences, party 2 improves by deviating to m 2 2 since then, as speci…ed in (4), the outcome is f2; 3g contradicting that m 1 2 is a dominant strategy for party 2 when its preferences are 1 2 . Suppose that g(m 1 1 ; m 1 2 ; m 2 3 ) = f2; 3g ; then given its preferences, party 1 improves by deviating to m 2 1 since then, as speci…ed in (4), the outcome is f1; 2g which contradicts that m 1 1 is a dominant strategy for party 1 when its preferences are 1 1 . This proves that no party has a dominant strategy, in contradiction with the assumption that the Stable Function is implementable in dominant strategies.
The direct mechanism is the general canonical mechanism where the message space of each party contains its pro…les of preferences over coalitions, and the outcome function selects the stable coalition from the announced pro…les of preferences. We …nd that the direct mechanism fails in our setting because it is not a dominant strategy for each party to truthfully reveal its preferences. Furthermore, there is no other mechanism implementing in dominant strategies the stable function.
We consider next implementation in Nash equilibrium. For that, we propose a simultaneous-move mechanism that avoids a rule of order among parties. Each party simultaneously announces a coalition that includes itself, i.e., M i = ffi; jg ; fi; kgg for all i 2 N: The outcome function is such that if two parties announce the same coalition, such coalition is formed. If every two parties announce a di¤erent coalition there is a lottery, denoted by L; that assigns equal probability to the three possible coalitions. This lottery represents the situation where there is no consensus and therefore, any coalition can …nally govern. 14 From a normative perspective, this mechanism is simple since it has a reduced message space, and natural since it can be interpreted in the context where it is applied. We call this mechanism the simultaneous-unanimity mechanism (based on the simultaneous-unanimity game of von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) .
The messages where each party announces its top-ranked coalition are Nash equilibrium. We …nd, however, that the proposed mechanism has Nash equilibria which do not yield stable coalitions. Consider, for instance, the following pro…le of preferences where f1; 2g is stable: The pro…le of messages (m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ) = (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) is a Nash equilibrium where g(m) = f2; 3g : If party 1 or party 3 deviate, they may not improve, and if party 2 deviates, the outcome function selects the lottery that may not improve party 2. Thus, we conclude that the proposed mechanism fails at implementing the stable function in Nash equilibrium (even when the 14 Preferences are measured according to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. 13 lottery L is substituted by a concrete coalition). 15 In this example, party 2 accepts forming government with party 3 even when it is not its top-ranked option.
Next, we aim at …nding the minimal extension of the previous mechanism that guarantees Nash-implementation. We enlarge each party's message space with an additional message so that M i = ff1; 2g , f1; 3g , f2; 3gg for all i 2 N . As in the previous mechanism, each party simultaneously announces a message. We call this proposal the enlarged-simultaneous-unanimity mechanism (see Figure 3 ).
There are basically two rules that describe the outcome function. Rule 1: if two (or more) parties fi; jg announce the same coalition S = fi; jg ; then the outcome function proposes coalition S. Rule 2: if two parties fi; jg announce the same coalition S 6 = fi; jg and the remaining party announces another coalition S 0 , the outcome function selects the coalition that is complement to the party in the intersection, i.e., g(m) = N nS \ S 0 . There are two exceptions to this rule: when party 1 and party 2 announce S = f2; 3g ; then g(m) = m 3 ; and when party 2 and party 3 announce S = f1; 2g ; then g(m) = m 1 .
The mechanism preserves anonymity since every party has the same message space, and it is selected by the outcome function the same number of times .   1   2   3   12  13  23   23   23  12  13   13  12  23  23   23  12  13   13  13  12  12  23  13  12  23  13  12  23  13  12  23   23  12  13   13  12  23  13  12  23  13  12   12 12 12  23  12 23  23 13 13  13 13  13  13  23 23  23  12  12  23 23  23  12  12  12  13 13 13 Figure 3 : Enlarged-simultaneous-unanimity mechanism
The outcome function is designed in such a way that in every Nash equilibrium, the two parties that form the stable coalition announce such coalition, regardless of the message of the remaining party. Thus, for every other pro-…le of messages, at least one of the political parties improves by deviating.
Here comes our …nal result.
Theorem 3
The enlarged-simultaneous-unanimity mechanism double implements the Stable Function in Nash and strong-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (See Appendix B) .
The proposed mechanism is immune to deviations of coalitions since every Nash equilibrium of the game is also strong-Nash equilibrium. 16 
Conclusion
When agreements between political parties are binding, and are made according to a weighted rule, we escape from the standard results of an empty core. Gamsons's Law and equal share, among others, are procedures to reach agreements that qualify as weighted rules. As we have shown, every weighted rule yields a unique stable coalition. This result gives us the opportunity to analyze the problem of coalition governments from a normative perspective since the stable coalition becomes the socially desirable outcome.
The weighted agreements induce a restricted domain of preferences over coalitions. The fact that this admissible domain has a non-Cartesian product structure is the key to show that no dominant-solvable protocol can be designed to guarantee a stable coalition-government. This is an unexpected result since, as we have shown, the admissible domain of preferences over coalitions is particularly reduced.
Our personal view is that a mechanism (or protocol) applied to solve the problem of coalition governments must be su¢ ciently simple and natural. We …nd, however, that the simplest and most natural mechanism that we can propose in this line (the simultaneous-unanimity mechanism), does not implement in Nash equilibrium the stable function. The positive result comes from showing that there is a way of extending this mechanism such that the stable coalition is derived from every Nash and strong Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. 17 We then conclude that there are political scenarios where we can design procedures that reach e¢ cient and stable coalition-governments. These procedures may correct those situations where parties cannot agree by themselves on a coalition to govern. equilibrium, f1; 2g 1 f1; 3g and f1; 2g 2 f2; 3g : Thus, f1; 2g is top ranked for party 1 and party 2, which implies that f1; 2g is stable. Let m = (f1; 3g ; m 2 ; f1; 3g) where m 2 2 M 2 ; then g(m) = f1; 3g : By Nash equilibrium, f1; 3g 1 f1; 2g and f1; 3g 2 f2; 3g : Thus, f1; 3g is top ranked for party 1 and party 3, which implies thatf1; 3g is stable. Let m = (m 1 ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) where m 1 2 M 1 ; then g(m) = f2; 3g : By Nash equilibrium, f2; 3g 2 f1; 2g and f2; 3g 3 f1; 3g : Thus, f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3, and this implies that f2; 3g is stable. Third, we show that the mechanism has no other Nash equilibrium. Let m = (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f2; 3g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g and g (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, f2; 3g must be top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, it must be the case that f2; 3g is bottom ranked for party 1. Then, party 1 improves by deviating since g (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) where g(m) = f2; 3g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 2g and g (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f2; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 1. In such case, party 1 can improve by deviating since g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) where g(m) = f2; 3g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 2g and g (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f2; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 1. In this case, party 1 improves by deviating since g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f1; 3g : Since g (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g and g (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 3g is top ranked for party 1 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 2. In this case, party 2 improves by deviating since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 3g) where g(m) = f1; 2g : Since g (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g and g (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 2g is top ranked for party 1 and party 2. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 2g must be bottom ranked for party 3. In this case, party 3 improves by deviating since g (f1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f1; 3g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g and g (f1; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 3g is top ranked for party 1 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 3g is bottom ranked for party 2. In this case, party 2 improves by deviating since g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g) where g(m) = f2; 3g : Since g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 2g and g (f1; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f2; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 1. In this case, party 1 improves by deviating since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 2g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f2; 3g : Since g (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g and g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f2; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 1. In this case, party 1 improves by deviating since g (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) where g(m) = f1; 2g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 3g and g (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 2g is top ranked for party 1 and party 2. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 2g must be bottom ranked for party 3. In this case, party 3 improves by deviating since g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f1; 2g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 3g and g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 2g is top ranked for party 1 and party 2. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 2g must be bottom ranked for party 3. In this case, party 3 can improve by deviating since g (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f2; 3g : Since g (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g and g (f2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f2; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 1. In this case, party 1 improves by deviating since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g, a contradiction. Let m = (f2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g) where g(m) = f1; 3g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 2g and g (f2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f2; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 1. In this case, party 1 improves by deviating since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 2g, a contradiction. Let m = (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f1; 3g be a Nash equilibrium. If party 2 deviates, it can achieve either g (f2; 3g ; f12g ; f1; 2g) = f2; 3g or g (f2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 2g. Thus, it must be the case that f1; 3g is stable since otherwise, party 2 can improve by deviating. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 3g must be top ranked for party 1 and party 3, and bottom ranked for party 2. It implies, however, that party 2 improves, a contradiction. Let m = (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) where g(m) = f1; 2g : Since g (f1; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 3g and g (f2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 2g is top ranked for party 1 and party 2. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 2g must be bottom ranked for party 3. In this case, party 3 improves by deviating since g (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 3g. Hence, the described pro…le of messages cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Let m = (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) where g(m) = f1; 2g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f1; 3g and g (f2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 2g is top ranked for party 1 and party 2. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 2g must be bottom ranked for party 3. In this case, party 3 improves by deviating since g (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) where g(m) = f1; 2g : Since g (f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f1; 3g and g (f2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1; 2g is top ranked for party 1 and party 2. Then, by Corollary 1, f1; 2g must be bottom ranked for party 3. In this case party 3 improves by deviating since g (f2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, a contradiction. Let m = (f2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 3g) where g(m) = f1; 3g : Since g (f1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 2g and g (f2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f2; 3g) = f2; 3g, to guarantee that m is a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f2; 3g is top ranked for party 2 and party 3. Then, by Corollary 1, f2; 3g must be bottom ranked for party 1. In this case, party 1 improves by deviating since g (f1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 3g) = f1; 2g, a contradiction.
